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Immunity for Child
Sex Trafficking Extended to Backpage.com:
Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC
Steven B. Taylor*
"In this litigation, two important public policies collide head on-the
suppression of child sex trafficking and the promotion of a free and open
Internet.", Plaintiffs allege that they were molested and repeatedly raped af-
ter being advertised as sexual wares by their "pimps" on Defendants' web-
site, Backpage.com (Backpage).2 One of the plaintiffs was a fifteen-year-old
runaway who alleges that her advertised "services" resulted in ten to twelve
sex "transactions" each and every day.3 She was raped more than 1,000 times
through the use of Backpage.4 The other plaintiffs have similar stories.5
Backpage contends, and the District Court of Massachusetts agrees, that most
of the Doe plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Communications Decency
Act (CDA).6
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants'
business practices violate both the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) and the Massachusetts Anti-Human
Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA), and also constitute
unfair and deceptive business practices under the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act.7 Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Com-
plaint for failure to state a claim.8 The case was dismissed, and an appeal to
the First Circuit is now pending.9
To support the motion to dismiss, Backpage relied primarily on the im-
munity provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230. Immunity results from the requirement
that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
* Steven B. Taylor is a candidate for a Juris Doctor at SMU Dedman School of
Law. He would like to thank his amazing wife, Kelli, for encouraging him and
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1. Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 151 (D. Mass.
2015).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 153.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 151; see 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
7. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 154; see 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2015); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50 (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9 (2004).
8. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 154; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
9. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
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tion content provider,"o and the concomitant preemption of "cause[s] of ac-
tion . . . brought ... under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section.""I The local government amici curiae argue, however, that Backpage
is also an "information content provider," an entity that § 230 defines as "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other inter-
active computer service."' 2 Thus, whether alleged child sex trafficking vic-
tims may have their day in court turns on whether Backpage, clearly an
interactive computer service (ICS), is also an information content provider.
For reasons set forth below, the court erred in failing to recognize Backpage
as an information content provider.
I. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996
The immunity provision of the Communications Decency Act was
prompted by a state court case holding Prodigy, an online service provider,
responsible for defamatory messages posted on its message board.13 By re-
moving some messages, Prodigy became legally responsible for messages it
failed to remove.1 4 The court reasoned that self-policing made Prodigy like a
newspaper publisher and thus held it responsible for the publication of the
defamatory remarks of another.15 In a similar case, Compuserve, another ser-
vice provider, was held not responsible for the remarks of another because it
had no opportunity to review the contents of a publication before it was
posted on their service.16 Accordingly, the two rulings created the unpalat-
able result where an ICS attempting to police postings faced liability while
another ICS making no attempt to filter problematic posts escaped all liabil-
ity.'7 Naturally, after the rulings, no online service provider would attempt to
filter any messages, no matter how harmful.1S To correct this faulty result,
Congress added § 230, which provides "[p]rotection for 'Good Samaritan'
blocking and screening of offensive material."I9 Ironically, the District Court
10. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
11. § 230(e)(3).
12. § 230(f)(3); Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 156 (emphasis added).
13. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)).
14. Id.
15. Id.




19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163.
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of Massachusetts construes the provision to provide immunity even to the
malicious "Samaritan."
II. APPLYING THE IMMUNITY PROVISION OF 47 U.S.C. § 230
In Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, the court was presented with
the question of whether § 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides
immunity to the owners of Backpage from allegedly advertising, as sexual
wares, underage children who were "molested and repeatedly raped" as a
result of the advertisements.20
A. Factual and Procedural History
"Backpage is an online classifieds forum that groups goods and services
advertised for sale by geographic location and subject matter."21 The forum
provides an "adult entertainment" section with an "escorts" subsection.22 The
Plaintiffs allege that the subsection is notorious for illicit trafficking of chil-
dren for the sex trade and that Backpage's operation largely depends on reve-
nues earned from this criminal usage. 23 Plaintiffs allege that Backpage
structures the adult entertainment section to "lightly camouflage its illegal
content to divert the attention of law enforcement."24 To support this asser-
tion, Plaintiffs allege that Backpage charges a material fee for each advertise-
ment while age verification and identity are not required.25 The payment is
accepted through anonymous means (e.g. prepaid debit cards and Bitcoin),
and a poster entering an age less than eighteen will simply be prompted to re-
enter another age. 26 Plaintiffs also allege the company removes identifying
metadata associated with photographs before publishing, and that the
Backpage filtering system, as a pretext, removes some words or phrases
while still allowing others that imply that the escort is underage.27 In sum,
Plaintiffs allege that Backpage has created a "fagade of concern" by engaging
in a "phony war" against sex traffickers designed only to divert attention
from their illegal activity.28
The three plaintiffs all make similar claims of harm due to Backpage's
business practices.29 While under the age of eighteen, each minor child rou-
20. Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d 148, 151 (D. Mass. 2015).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 152.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 152.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 152-53.
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tinely had their "services" advertised on Backpage by pimps.30 The ads used
words to signify their age like "young," "new," "tiny," and "playful."31
While in the "thrall" of their pimps, Plaintiffs were bought and raped
thousands of times by those responding to the hundreds of ads placed on
Backpage. 32
In October 2014, Plaintiffs brought suit in federal court, alleging that
Backpage had, inter alia, violated the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) and the Massachusetts Anti-Human
Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA).33 In January 2015,
Backpage moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.34
Backpage relied primarily on the immunity provided by Congress in § 230 to
have the case dismissed.35
B. Backpage's Argument for Immunity
Section 230 states "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider"36 and that such ICSs are immune
from "cause[s] of action . . . brought . . . under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section."37 Backpage contends that the Plaintiffs'
claims are preempted because Backpage had no part in creating the allegedly
harmful postings.38
Amici curiae for Plaintiffs argue that Backpage is an "information con-
tent provider," and therefore is not entitled to immunity.39 Section 230(f)
defines an information content provider as "any person or entity that is re-
sponsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service."40
The amici contend that Backpage provides content by: (1) "designing the
escorts section of the website in such a way as to signal readers that sex with
children is sold here"; (2) "coaching the crafting of ads by allowing misspell-
30. Id. at 153.
31. Id.
32. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 153.
33. Id. at 154.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)).
37. Id. (quoting § 230(e)(3)).
38. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 154.
39. Id. at 156.
40. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012).
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ings of suggestive terms"; (3) "stripping metadata from posted photos"; and
(4) "posting illegal materials in sponsored ads."41
The amici argument relies heavily on Fair Housing Council of San Fer-
nando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC.42 In Roommates.com, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Roommates.com, while an ICS, was not immune from suit
because it was also an information content provider.43 The court based its
decision on the fact that Roomates.com elicited information about personal
characteristics of users that is forbidden by the Fair Housing Act and used
that information to develop advertisement content.44
C. Holding and Rationale
In this case, the District Court of Massachusetts distinguished Room-
mates.com, noting that the case attempted to draw a line between the "active
control" over content exercised by Roommates.com and the "neutral interac-
tive service" that is intended to enjoy immunity under § 230.45 The court held
that the practices of Backpage did not amount to affirmative participation in
an illegal venture or web content creation.46 In support of its finding, the
court cited several distinguishing factors: (1) the escort section does not re-
quire users to offer or search for commercial sex with children; (2) the auto-
matic categorization of ads into the "escorts" category is not content creation;
(3) stripping metadata from photographs is a standard practice; and (4) ac-
cepting anonymous payment is not illegal.47 In sum, the court reasoned,
"Backpage's passivity and imperfect filtering system may be appropriate
targets for criticism, but they do not transform Backpage into an information
content provider."48
III. THE COURT'S ADMITTEDLY HARSH RULING
WAS IN ERROR
In order to avoid misunderstanding, the court clarified that it sympa-
thizes with the "tragic plight" described by Plaintiffs and regards the sex
trafficking of children as an "abhorrent evil."49 The court further explained
41. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 156.
42. Id.; see Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
43. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185.




47. Id. at 157.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 165.
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that it was fully aware that sex traffickers exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Internet as a marketing tool.50 Yet, notwithstanding this injustice, the "court
has no choice but to adhere to the law that Congress has seen fit to enact."51
Of course, Congress should certainly amend the immunity provision to nar-
row its overly broad application. Nonetheless, there are reasonable construc-
tions of the statute that do not result in immunity for a business that sells
children for sex. 5 2
On September 3, 2015, the Supreme Court of Washington decided J.S.
v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC-a case with practically identical
facts and claims.53 It held that Backpage was not afforded immunity under
§ 230.54 The court's decision resulted from an obvious and reasonable inter-
pretation of § 230.55 The District Court of Massachusetts should have arrived
at the same conclusion.
The District Court of Massachusetts erred in concluding that
Backpage's "passivity" did not "transform" it into an information content
provider. First, there is no rigid dichotomy between an ICS and an informa-
tion content provider; an ICS can also be an information content provider,
which rightfully does not enjoy immunity for content provided.56 Second, the
court focused on content creation as the test for an information content pro-
vider; however, content developers, which Plaintiffs allege Backpage to be,
are also content providers.57 Third, one can hardly claim Backpage's alleged
actions are "passive."
A. An Interactive Computer Service Can Also Be an Information
Content Provider
Complete immunity is not granted to an ICS under § 230(c)(1).58
Rather, § 230(c)(1) "simply precludes treating the user or [ICS] 'as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information' if that information was 'provided by
another information content provider.' "59 The statute does not shield an ICS
50. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
51. Id.
52. See J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 184 Wash. 2d 95, 98 (Wash.
2015).
53. See id. at 98-103.
54. Id. at 98.
55. Id. at 106 (Wiggins, J., concurring).
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); § 230(f)(3).
57. § 230(f)(3).
58. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 184 Wash. 2d at 106 (Wiggins, J., concurring).
59. Id. (quoting § 230(c)(1)) (Wiggins, J., concurring).
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from causes of action arising out of content it provides.60 Thus, while it is an
ICS, Backpage does not enjoy § 230 immunity from claims arising out of
information content it provides.61 The court created an inappropriately heavy
burden for alleged rape victims by requiring that Backpage be "transformed"
from an ICS to an information content provider in order to avoid immunity.
Section 230 merely requires a finding that Backpage is an information con-
tent provider, regardless of its simultaneous classification as an ICS.
B. Providing Information Content Includes Content Development
An information content provider is "any person or entity that is respon-
sible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service."62
The District Court of Massachusetts analyzed whether Backpage's alleged
activities qualify as "content creation."63 However, the court failed to deter-
mine whether the activities constitute development of information, certainly
a lesser burden for Plaintiffs.64
In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit, looking at the plain ordinary
meaning of the word and citing the dictionary, determined that "develop-
ment" could mean "making usable or available."65 Looking to Wikipedia, the
Ninth Circuit finds a "far more relevant definition" for web content develop-
ment: "the process of researching, writing, gathering, organizing and editing
information for publication on web sites."66 Thus, the District Court of Mas-
sachusetts erred by failing to address whether the facts pleaded constitute
development of information, as considered under § 230(f)(3).
C. The Facts Allege an Active Role in Content Development
If an ICS "passively displays content that is created entirely by third
parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to that content."67 Like-
wise, actively developing or creating content removes immunity from liabil-
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); Vii. Voice Media Holdings, 184 Wash. 2d at 106
(Wiggins, J., concurring).
61. See § 230(c)(1).
62. § 230(f)(3).
63. Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d. 149, 156 (D. Mass. 2015).
64. See id.
65. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 618 (2002)).
66. Id. (quoting Web Content Development, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web-contentdevelopment (last modified Oct. 7,
2015)).
67. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.
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ity for harm caused by the content. 68 Plaintiffs allege, among other things,
that Backpage: (1) designed the escort section in such a way as to "signal" to
readers that sex with children is sold on the website; (2) coached the crafting
of ads; and (3) stripped metadata from photos in order to make the advertise-
ments less traceable. 69 The acts alleged constitute an active role in at least
development of content, which disqualifies Backpage for immunity. Further,
regardless of the ruling, if Backpage has actually designed its escorts section
to signal the illegal activities, that act alone constitutes the creation of action-
able information. This surely removes Backpage from immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
On appeal, the First Circuit should reverse the dismissal and remand the
case for further proceedings. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, well-pleaded
facts, accepted as true and with all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiffs'
favor, must merely set forth "a plausible entitlement to relief."70 Because
Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Backpage partly developed or created content
that has caused them harm, 12(b)(6) dismissal should appropriately be
reversed.71
Plaintiffs allege that Backpage actively created harmful information by
signaling that sex with children is sold on the website.72 This amounts to
creation of information wholly apart from the ads that allegedly sold the un-
derage plaintiffs for sex. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Backpage actively
developed the harmful advertisements by coaching their design and stripping
metadata from photographs.73 These allegations are at least plausible, and
therefore, when accepted as true, Backpage is an information content pro-
vider unprotected by the immunity provisions of § 230.74 Accordingly, the
First Circuit should remand the case for further proceedings to determine
whether Backpage actively signaled to its users that sex with children was
sold on its website and whether Backpage actively stripped metadata and
coached the design of advertisements in development of the advertisement
content. If Backpage is found to have created or developed content it pro-
vides, which relates to the harm alleged by Plaintiffs, then § 230 immunity
should accordingly be denied.
68. See id.
69. Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 152 (D. Mass. 2016).
70. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 557, 559 (2007).
71. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672; Twombly, 550 U.S. 559; Backpage.com, 104 F.
Supp. 3d at 152.
72. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 156.
73. Id.
74. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012); J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC,
184 Wash. 2d 95, 103 (Wash. 2015).
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